McWeeny, Jennifer. 'Liberating Anger, Embodying Knowledge: A Comparative Study of María Lugones and Zen Master Hakuin.' Asian and Feminist Philosophies in Dialogue. New York Chichester, West Sussex: Columbia University Press, 2015. 295-315. Web.

'[...] all ask us to reconsider the dominatori view of our angers, which sees them as irrational, unjustified, hyper-sensitive, and morally and epistemologically unproductive. In doing so, these philosophers encourage us to understand our angers as lucid and appropriate responses to sexism, racism, classism, heterosexism, ablism, first-worldism, and other institutionalized oppressions. Such feminist analyses of anger are often grounded, either explicitly or implicitly, in the radical idea that angry experience is a kind of knowing experience.'

--> What ive been saying!!!!

'According to Lugones, "first-order" anger is a communicative anger that vies for respect from the oppressor in the 'official world of sense' (Lugones 2003, 108). First-order angers include the angers discussed by Frye and Spelman: righteous anger about having been treated unjustly or unfairly (Frye 1983, 85-86), demanding anger that asks you to respect my domain and social position (Frye 1983, 87-90), and judgmental anger that blames another for wrongdoing (Spelman 1989, 266). As assertions of agency and claims to respect, first-order angers want uptake, that is, they want to be included and heeded in the prevailing world of sense.' (296-297)

'First-order angers thus accommodate a one self/one world ontology, because the angry person attempts to fither self into the given world by demanding respect and fair treatment from that world.' (297)

'[...] Lugones describes 'second-order' anger as a separatist, uncommunicative anger that recognizes that the angry self and the metaphysical presuppositions of the official world of sense are mutually exclusive.' (297)

'Hence, the 'second-order' label is appropriate for this type of anger, not because it is anger about being angry, as one entrenched in a one self/one world ontology might suspect, but because it is the anger of a different, 'second' self. The very existence of this second self is fundamentally incompatible with the firstworld and with the first, subordinate self who survives in that world.' (297)

'On the one hand, Lugones claims that each person consists in a multiplicity of different selves and experiences these selves as different.On the other hand, although Lugones denies the existence of any 'underlying I,' she affirms that a person is somehow able to identify each different self as 'me.'' (297)

--> My autistic experiences

'Thus described, Lugones's ontological pluralism beckons us to explore the spatiality of second-order anger: Where, in relation to the multiplicity of worlds, is second-order anger located? And which of our multiplicity of selves is capable of this emotion?' (298)

'The location of second-order anger, then, is across, rather than within, worlds of sense (33, 111, 115). We can thus infer that the self of second-order anger must inhabit what Lugones calls 'the limen,' a gap between universes of sense (59). The limen is a 'creative preparation' and a 'way of life' (Lugones 2006, 79, 83); it is the space/moment where we are most aware of our own multiplicity and where we are best able to see different structures critically. (Lugones 2003, 59). Temporally, second-order anger is forward-looking as it moves to create new liberatory sensibilities. Spatially, second-order anger lies between the firstworld of the dominators and the third world of the oppressed: it is a borderland territory that resists assimilation to either side.' (298-299)

'However, the separatist, incommunicative character of second-order anger is oriented by a hope for transformation and connection: the angry self's willingness to create new meanings that elude the logic of oppression- her ability to be playful- is a condition for the possibility of coalition-building activities like 'world'-traveling, 'complex communication' (Lugones 2006, 84), love, and liberation. By placing us in the limen, second-order angers give us the chance to renegotiate perceptual, social, and linguistic meanings to better accord with the fullness and complexity of reality, which includes its back side, even though this back side is invisible when viewed from the dominant, habitual perspective. Here, the angry self participates in a way of knowing that does not drive a wedge between the experiences of our resistant, germinating selves and the languages of their expression.' (300)

'However, in positing the identity of nirvana and samsara, Buddhist metaphysics encounters an ontological problem similar to the one generated by Lugones's ontological pluralism: How can reality be both unitary and plural at the same time? Unlike Lugones, Rinzai Buddhists address this problem by abandoning ontological pluralism in favor of an epistemological pluralism: nirvana and samsara are not two different realities, but are instead two different ways of engaging/perceiving one reality.' (302)

--> Houseki no kuni

'Thus, for Hakuin, enlightenment is not an uncommon state of mind that is attained through meditation; it is rather the interminable epistemological process of recognizing that you are not the self that you have come to believe you are.' (300)

'This place of lively, spontaneous responsiveness is 'no-place,' because it is an indeterminate landscape that is fashioned by the coexistence of opposing ideas, words, and identities.' (302)

--> Life is not a binary

--> dbt

'Second-order anger is a knowing anger because it is a practical mode of traveling between cognitive frameworks, and hence it is a way of seeing the deep structures that constitute meanings and sense. Self-less anger is a knowing anger because it demonstrates, or embodies, being fully present in and mindful of the whole of reality, including those aspects of reality that exceed dualistic logics, languages, and actions.' (304)

'As our perceptions of Necker cubes and duck-rabbit pictures illustrate, reality is able to sustain multiple determinations and perspectives, although none can be sustained exhaustively and no two contradictory perspectives can be sustained at exactly the same time (36).' (305)

--> DBT and difference between double-think(1984)

'As experiences of disharmonies between our bodily orientations and the uptake they receive from their situating world of sense, our angers are our realizations of these dissonances, in the double senses of 'realization' as 'awareness' and 'instantiation.' Our angers thus demonstrate what we know when we attend to the tension and slack of those intentional threads that embed our practices within a world.' (306)

--> Anger as dissonance

'Given this notion of 'self,' itseems perfectly permissible to conceive of a person as having more than one self and as possibly having selves who are different from and contradictory to one another.' (309)

--> Multiplicity of the self

Luna, Zakiya. 'Location Matters: The 2017 Women’s Marches as Intersectional Imaginary 1.' Intersectionality in Feminist and Queer Movements. 1st ed. Routledge, 2020. 46–63. Web.

--> Location as in physical location but also socio-location and positioning

'To refer to one’s standpoint means to reflect on one’s own position with a set of oppressions and privileges. Standpoint theorists presume that a person’s location influences how she experiences the world' (47)

'Movement work involves imagining a future where there is a different set of relationships, different models of distributing resources, a different configuration of people in positions of power, and the like.' (48)

'Yet imagination is critical as it provides activists hope for the future, [...]' (49)

'Consequently, feminists of European descent relied on an individualistic approach to feminism that subtly evaded the challenge of producing intersectional collective efforts.'(49)

--> Individualistic versus collectivist cultures

'Ultimately, theoretical knowledge of the importance of intersectionality or imagining feminist movements that welcome a diversity of bodies and perspectives cannot guarantee the production of this diversity in practice.'(49)

--> Do the work!!!

'This ‘social memory’ is of the type that will, ironically, become part of media representations of what protest is ‘supposed’ to look like.'(50)

--> On looting, diversity of aesthetics, when is violence acceptable?

'The first author, a Black woman, felt like she and her daughter became a spectacle for picture taking by White protesters who wanted to document their participation. Documenting racial minorities’ presence can be read as an attempt by White protesters to demonstrate they are participating in an ‘authentically’ diverse women’s movement, engaging literally in what I have discussed in another paper as proximity practices (Luna 2017). The authors later questioned whether the audience of primarily White-appearing women would show the same level of support for marches explicitly focused on indigenous women and women of colour. Thus, the material realities of march locations alongside the embodied experience of marchers combine to create an intriguing analyses of a ‘shared’ protest Experience.'(51)

--> On tokenism

--> Reflecting on my own artistry

'This respondent acknowledges emotions and embodied experience that can be present when vocalising concerns: fear and discomfort can be ‘scary.’ Yet, she also identifies the need to vocalise as only required when she is ‘relatively privileged to do so.’ This implies that a responsibility applies in situations when she feels she has power.' (54)

--> Interesting…

--> Individualistic focus

'The guideline implies marchers should behave in a certain way for a semi-imagined audience of children who compose an imagined future. The guidelines construct young people as empty vessels waiting to be filled with ‘hope and positive messages,’ as if they could not have their own feelings or responses to the activity.'(55)

--> Policing protests cmon

--> Kill the cop inside your head!!!

'While there is much to be gained from hope and positivity, these guidelines suggest that the appropriate way to engage in protest is to channel feeling ‘mad, sad, disappointed’ into feeling ‘positive.’ The guidelines subtly present feeling ‘mad,’ which connotes anger, as bad and positivity as good. By presenting these emotions as mutually exclusive, the guidelines discouraged expressions of ‘negative’ feelings. The insistence on kindness and positivity also appear particularly gendered, encouraging women to behave properly no matter how unjust they feel the Circumstances.'(55)

--> Emotions are emotions there are no ‘good’ or ‘bad’ emotions

'In both cases they have imagined a unity among the massive category of ‘women’ that does not exist. The perceived quantity of protestors or quantity of issues present at a specific march did not automatically translate to perception of quality of participation.'(59)

--> It's almost as if a socially constructed category is not unifying because unity is also constructed